Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Manufacturing has long been considered a quintessential stepping stone on the development ladder due to its ability to employ unskilled workers productively (Lewis, 1954) . Reallocating workers from agriculture to manufacturing promises large gains in economy-wide productivity, and structural transformation-fuelled growth can take place even if`fundamentals' such as educational attainments lag behind (Rodrik, 2013) .
However, a recent literature initiated by Rodrik (2016) documents that developing countries have been running out of manufacturing employment opportunities earlier and at much lower levels of income in recent decades, compared to the experience of early industrializers. This raises the question to what degree manufacturing is still able to play its traditional role in economic development.
Existing studies of premature industrialization focus on aggregate manufacturing employment, which leaves open the question what kind of jobs have disappeared`prematurely'. In particular, is it jobs that unskilled workers from the countryside may previously have been able to take up? Moroever, many of the benets ascribed to manufacturing pertain in particular to formal manufacturing, whereas La Porta and Shleifer (2008) paint a rather bleak picture of wages and productivity in informal manufacturing rms.
Hence, the consequences of premature deindustrialization for development prospects hinge on whether it is mostly formal or informal manufacturing jobs that have disappeared.
Second, there is some debate about the origins of`premature deindustrialization': Rodrik (2016) and Felipe et al. (2018) assign a prominent role to labor-saving technological progress, whereas Haraguchi et al. (2017) argue that developing countries' diculties are entirely due to globalization-and more specically, due to the entry of China into the world market, with its strong comparative advantage in manufacturing. 1 Moreover, the recent increases in manufacturing employment in some lower income countries such as Vietnam or Cambodia raise questions about the generality of the phenomenon of premature job losses.
From the perspective of the task literature initiated by Autor et al. (2003) , a testable implication of the technological change-based explanations is a reduction in labor demand for the production tasks that have only recently become automatable (as opposed to manufacturing employment across the board). However, such an assessment requires moving beyond aggregate manufacturing employment.
To address these questions, I analyze trends in manufacturing employment by occupation in 125 countries for multiple years between 1960 and 2014, obtained from harmonized household surveys. While the sample is imbalanced, country coverage goes signicantly beyond the 42 countries in Rodrik (2016) and the 62 countries in Felipe et al. (2018) , and the sample includes a greater number of poorer developing countries in particular. A subset of the surveys also includes data on education, wages, and the formality of employment.
1 This makes Haraguchi et al. (2017) considerably more optimistic about the future prospects for manufacturing-led growth in developing countries:`After its success in labor intensive industries, China is likely to upgrade its industrial structure following the path of high-income countries. Once this happens, there may be greater opportunities for current low-income countries to pursue manufacturing activities; manufacturing would then perhaps become more, not less, important for them. Thus, the recommendation for developing countries is to not turn away from manufacturing and abandon the path of economic development through industrialization, but to emulate the experience of rapid industrialization that occurred even in recent years' (p. 307).
2
Analyzing employment trends in manufacturing from the perspective of occupations is insightful because occupations dier along three dimensions that are relevant to the open questions: they require dierent levels of skill, dier in their typical level of formality of employment, and also dier in their intensity in tasks that are suitable to automation by ICT.
Drawing on the survey data, I document four stylized facts about premature deindustrialization: rst, it is mostly unskilled jobs that have disappeared, and also the wage premium of workers with little formal education in manufacturing, relative to other industries, has declined. Second, disappearing jobs tend to be formalboth relative to the overall labor market, and to the manufacturing average. Third, it is driven by occupations which are intensive in tasks that are that are suitable to automation by ICT. And nally, it has to date been a high and middle income country-phenomenon, as low income countries have been spared from premature job losses.
In the next Section, I present my data and look for evidence of premature deindustrialization separately by occupation: essentially, I compare the results from regressing manufacturing employment shares by occupation on country xed eects and ln GDP per capitaincluding an interaction of ln GDP per capita with a time-dummy for the later part of my sample period, in order to identify which occupations account for the`premature' losses in aggregate manufacturing employment. Section 3 presents the four stylized facts about premature deindustrialization, drawing on the trends in the occupational employment structure and additional survey evidence. Section 4 oers an interpretation of my ndings.
Premature Deindustrialization Through the Lens of Occupations
Existing studies of premature deindustrialization rely on data sources that do not distinguish between different groups of manufacturing workers. 2 To address this gap, I combine census and survey data from thè Integrated Public Use Microdata Series' (IPUMS), provided by the Minnesota Population Center (2018), with survey data from the`International Income Distribution Database' (I2D2). I2D2 is a collection of harmonized and nationally representative household surveys introduced by Montenegro and Hirn (2009) and maintained by the World Bank. 3 Census and other survey data have the additional advantage that they tend to have more complete coverage of informal employment than national accounts data (McMillan et al., 2014 ).
2 They use data from either the UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, the Groningen Growth or Development Center (Timmer et al., 2015a) , or the database on manufacturing employment for 63 countries assembled by Felipe et al. (2018) from various sources. The UN data and the data set by Felipe et al. (2018 ) go back to 1970 , whereas the Timmer et al. (2015a data set includes only 42 countries, but goes back to the late 1940s/ early 1950s for many of them. Rodrik (2016) does present evidence of a recent reduction in the demand for unskilled workers in the manufacturing industries of the countries represented in the`World Input Output Database' by Timmer et al. (2015b) (see Section 3 for a more detailed discussion). However, the countries in this sample are mostly high income countries, and the data start only in 1995. Hence, this result cannot easily be compared to his nding of premature deindustrialization in developing countries when comparing the pre-1990 to the post-1990 period.
3 I2D2 is currently not openly available to researchers outside the World Bank. I am grateful to Kathleen G. Beegle, Claudio E. Montenegro, David Newhouse and Aditi Mishra for making these data available to me.
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The resulting data set contains the distribution of manufacturing employment across the nine major occupation groups of the`International Standard Classication of Occupations' (ISCO) for 980 country-year observations from 148 countries between 1960 and 2016. I add data on GDP in 2011 international dollar and population from the Penn World Table (Feenstra et al., 2015) to obtain my main analysis sample: it contains data on employment and income from 125 countries, accounting for 91 percent of the world population in 2014, for at least two years between 1960 and 2014 (with an average of 7.4 years per country, and an average spread of 19 years between the rst and the last survey). Appendix A describes the sample construction and coverage in more detail.
To examine how the manufacturing employment share of a country typically varies with income, Column
(1) of Table 1 regresses it on ln GDP per capita and its square, ln population and its square, decade dummies and country xed eects (corresponding to the specication in Rodrik (2016) ). The population terms control for the size of the home market (although results are not sensitive to omitting them), and the country xed eects control for dierences in time invariant dierences between countries, for instance related to geography.
The results conrm Rodrik's nding that aggregate manufacturing employment exhibits a signicant inverse U-shape in income, using a dierent data source.
In Table 2 , I test for a tendency of total manufacturing employment to decline`prematurely' in recent decades by replacing the decade dummies with a dummy variable taking a value of one for surveys from the period after 1990 and its interactions with the ln GDP per capita-terms. 4 Column (1) shows that the humpshaped relationship between manufacturing employment and income is driven by the post-1990 observations, as the GDP per capita-terms without post 1990-interactions are jointly insignicant (p-value=0.21). For a visual representation, Figure 1 plots the corresponding tted employment share for a`typical' country with median population and average country xed eects against income, both with and without taking into account the post 1990-interactions: while the predicted peak employment share is close to 16 percent in both periods, the estimated GDP per capita level at the peak of manufacturing employment declines substantially, from $18,700 to $5,000. 5 Next, I move beyond the previous literature by distinguishing between ve sub-groups of manufacturing workers, which allow for a rened perspective on the phenomenon of premature deindustrialization: 4 As Rodrik writes, using the 1990 year as a break-point is somewhat arbitrarybut it ensures a sucient number of observations on either side, and is also useful as a demarcation of the period in which globalization and the adoption of ICT gathered speed.
5 In Rodrik (2016) , peak manufacturing employment declines from 21.5 to 18.9 percent between both periods, and the income level at which it is reached falls from $11,000 to $4,300 (in 1990 dollars). Part of the dierence to his numbers is explained by the fact that Rodrik does not include the post 1990-dummy also independently in his empirical specication (cf. his Table 9 ), thereby not allowing for a trend in the share of manufacturing employment between both periods that is unrelated to dierences in ln GDP per capita. If I follow him and exclude the independent post-1990 dummy, my estimates of the income level at peak manufacturing employment for both periods are closer to his estimates (namely, they change to $11,000 and $5,100 respectively, in 2011 dollars), whereas my estimates of the peak manufacturing employment shares remain lower than his (namely, they change to 16.3 and 16.2 percent respectively). This is likely because the 42 countries in his sample include a larger share of relatively industrialized countries (compared to my sample of 125 countries), and because his sample reaches back to the late 1940s/early 1950s (compared to at most 1960 in my sample). With respect to the heterogeneity of premature deindustrialization across occupations documented below, results are similar regardless of whether I omit the independent post 1990-dummy or include it.
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`elementary occupations',`machine operators',`craftsmen' and`clerks' correspond directly to ISCO major groups, whereas`professionals' subsume ISCO major groups 1-3. 6 These occupations will be characterized in increasing detail throughout the rest of the paper. 7 To start with, columns (2)-(6) of Table 1 show how manufacturing employment in these ve occupation groups varies with income. Point estimates suggest that employment shares for all of them, except professionals, follow an inverse U-shape. However, Figure 2 (which again plots the tted employment shares for a`typical' country in the sample) highlights that the occupational employment structure varies strongly with income: at low income levels, manufacturing employment consists almost entirely of craftsmen. Craftsman employment in turn peaks already at a GDP per capita around $3,300which is when employment in the other occupations, and especially of machine operators, tends to grow rapidly. Employment in clerical and elementary occupations peaks at intermediate income levels ($8,900 and $9,100 respectively), whereas machine operator employment only declines after an income of $17,000 has been reached. Employment of manufacturing professionals even increases over the entire observed income range. 8 In Section 3, I argue that for the debate about the origins of premature deindustrialization as well as for its labor market consequences, it matters which of these occupations account for the`premature' employment losses after 1990. To rst establish the facts, columns (2)-(6) of Table 2 show that the premature deindustrialization in terms of aggregate manufacturing employment shown in column (1) is driven by machine operator-, elementary-and clerical occupations, as these occupations also experienced signicantly decreasing employment shares after 1990 (conditional on income). By contrast, the interaction terms are insignicant for craftsmen and professional occupations (individually as well as jointly). Figure 3 plots the corresponding tted employment shares by income: it shows that a peak only exists for the post-1990 period for elementary occupations (at $10,400), machine operators (at $8,100) and clerks (at $5,800), whereas tted employment increases almost linearly over the observed income range during the early period. Moroever, the simulated peak employment shares decrease substantially: from 3.4 to 1.6 percent 6 And hence,`managers',`professionals' and`technicians and associate professionals'. Occupations in these major groups tend to be intensive in skilled and non-routine tasks, and distinguishing between them reveals no large dierences that would be relevant to the arguments made in this paper. Appendix B presents the description of the ISCO major groups by the ILO, which I will introduce in more detail in Section 3.
7 These characterizations will stay at the level of major groups and total manufacturing, since the surveys contain occupation and industry-coding only at the 1-digit level of ISCO and ISIC. However, the`Occupational Wages Around the World' (OWW) database, rst described by Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) , contains examples from each of these ve aggregated occupation groups at the 4-digit level of ISCO, and the 2-digit level if ISIC. For instance, it includes the machine operator occupations thread and yarn spinner' and`cloth weaver (machine)' from the textiles industry, as well as the craftsman occupation`loom xer, tuner' and the elementary occupation`labourer'. The occupations from the printing & publishing industry include the clerical occupation`oce clerk', and occupations from the chemical industry include the`chemical engineer'. See Kunst (2019) for more examples at the level of more disaggregated occupations and industries, including detailed task descriptions. 8 For an alternative perspective, Appendix Figure C .1 plots the corresponding occupational employment shares after normalizing total manufacturing employment to 100 for every country-year, which facilitates answering the question which of the occupations is most important within manufacturing. As the Figure highlights , the answer to this question strongly depends on a country's income level: in the lowest income countries, more than 80 percent of manufacturing workers tend to be craftsmen, and craftsmen remain important also at intermediate income ranges. At the upper end of observed income levels, professionals are the most important group of manufacturing workers, and the employment share of the other occupations within manufacturing increases most strongly at low and intermediate income levels. See Kunst (2019) for an analysis of labor demand changes within manufacturing since the 1950s.
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for elementary occupations, 6.9 to 3.9 percent for machine operators, and 2 to 1.3 percent for clerks. By contrast, tted craftsman and professional employment look very similar for both periods, consistent with the small and insignicant interaction terms in Table 2 .
Appendix Table C .1 presents the results of two robustness checks: rst, I exclude about 6 percent of the surveys which do not contain manufacturing observations for all ve occupations (resulting in an employment share of zero for the respective occupation). This may indicate that some occupations did not play any role in the respective country and yearbut could also hint at issues with the sampling, or the harmonization of the occupation classication. However, results are robust to excluding such surveys.
Second, I keep only surveys from the 43 countries for which my sample includes at least one survey for both the period up to and after 1990. Also for this sub-sample, I nd a signicant shift in the relationship between manufacturing employment and income for total manufacturing as well as elementary, machine operator and clerical occupations, but not for craftsmen and professionals. This suggests that even within the same countries, the relationships between changes in income and manufacturing employment has changed. 9
In summary, the evidence robustly suggests that manufacturing employment in elementary-, machine operator-and clerical occupations has disappeared`prematurely' after 1990, whereas employment in craftsmanand professional occupations did not. In the next Section, I discuss the labor market consequences and origin of these employment trends by proposing four stylized facts about premature deindustrialization. The Figure shows the predicted manufacturing employment shares in the periods up to and after 1990 from a regression on ln GDP per capita and its square, a post-1990 dummy and its interactions with the ln GDP per capita-terms, ln population and its square, and country xed eects. Period and country eects are all averaged and the population size is set to the sample median to obtain the relationship for a`typical' country in the sample. Column (1) of Table   2 presents the specication. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.
are taken from I2D2 and IPUMS (see Section 2), and data on GDP per capita in 2011 International Dollars are taken from the Penn World Table 9 .0. The`mean dependent variables' in columns (2)-(6) not exactly add up to the number for total manufacturing in column (1), as the total include some manufacturing workers in major group 5 (`service and sales workers') and 6 (`skilled agricultural, forestry and shery workers'). However, these major groups tend to play a negligible role in manufacturing employment.`F-test joint GDP/c' in the bottom panel presents the p-value of an F-test for joint signicance of ln GDP per capita and its square. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.
variables in column (1) slightly exceeds the sum of columns (2)- (6) because it also includes manufacturing workers classied into major group 5 (`Service and sales workers') or major group 6 (`Skilled agricultural, forestry and shery workers'). These occupations are omitted from the analyses by occupation group as they tend to represent a negligible Table 3 presents average wage premia, educational attainments and average employment sharesboth for non-manufacturing versus manufacturing, and by manufacturing occupation. Not all of the variables are available for surveys from all countries, and column (1) indicates the number of countries across which the sample average has been calculated. Columns (2) and (3) of the rst panel show that on average, manufacturing workers tended to be relatively well paid: workers outside of manufacturing earned a 6.6 log points lower wage than those within (for which the wage premium in the second row is zero by construction), and this holds true across all income groups. 10
My preferred proxy for the skill requirements of manufacturing occupations are wage premia, as they take into account both formal education and skills obtained through training on the job. 11 Columns (4)-(8) present average wage premia by occupation group, relative to the average manufacturing wage: the lowest-paid manufacturing workers were those in machine operator-, craftsman-and in particular elementary occupations, who earned wages 27 log points below the manufacturing average in the pooled sample. Only in low income countries, machine operators commanded wages that were (insignicantly) above-average, and clerks were paid below the manufacturing average only in high income countries. The second and third panel show that also educational attainments of workers in elementary-, machine operator-or craftsman occupation tended to be below or similar to the manufacturing average.
Hence, premature deindustrialization is largely driven by relatively unskilled jobs in elementary and operator occupations. Medium-skilled clerks are also aectedbut the bottom panel shows that they represent a much smaller share of manufacturing employment, in particular in low and middle income countries. It is worth noting that for most of the sample period, machine operators tended to be even less skilled than their relative wage in Table 3 suggests: about 80 percent of the underlying surveys with income data in this Table are database by to show that in the 1950s, manufacturing operators earned wages that were on average 18 log points below those of craftsmen-in contrast to Table 3 , which suggests somewhat higher wages for machine operators than for craftsmen. 12
This also highlights a potential caveat of inferring changes in the demand for unskilled labor from changes in occupational employment: if machine operator jobs have become not only scarcer, but the remaining operator jobs also require higher skills, occupational employment trends understate the extent to which the demand for unskilled workers by manufacturing has decreased. One way of addressing this is to analyze the evolution of the wage premium that workers with a low educational attainment have been able to command in manufacturing, relative to other industries (irrespective of their occupation).
Figure 4 plots the evolution of this`manufacturing wage premium' among all workers with less than completed primary schooling for the rst and the last available year for the 12 countries with income data in IPUMS: a rst observation is that in all surveys, unskilled workers earned substantially higher wages in manufacturing than in other industries. In the rst year, they commanded 29 log points higher wages on average when working in manufacturing. However, the manufacturing wage premium decreased in 10 of the 12 countries, and the point estimate from a regression on country xed eects and a trend suggests an average decrease by 3.7 log points per decade.
Appendix Table C .2 shows that also in a sample of 88 countrieswhich includes all IPUMS and I2D2
surveys from countries with wage and educational attainment data for at least two years, the point estimate implies a similar decrease in the manufacturing wage premium among workers with less than completed primary schooling of 3.3 log points per decade. By contrast, there is no signicant trend in the relative wage of workers with a higher education (which on average also did not earn higher wages in manufacturing as compared to other industries).
These ndings are consistent with the results by Rodrik (2016) : he shows that in a sample of 40 mostly high income countries in the`World Input Output Database', it is the share of low-skilled workers who are employed in manufacturing that has declined after 1995, whereas the shares of medium and high skilled workers have remained relatively constant. 13 In summary, both occupational employment trends and the reduction of the`manufacturing wage premium' among workers with little formal education suggest that premature deindustrialization reects a reduction in manufacturing's ability to employ unskilled workers more productively than other industries. Columns (2) and (3) show that in all income groups, manufacturing workers were more likely to be in wage employment than those in other industries. The bottom panel shows that manufacturing workers score higher also in terms of other measures of formality such as having an employment contract, and they tended to work in larger establishments that were more often located in urban areas. 16 However, columns (4)- (8) show that there are large dierences between manufacturing occupations: in particular workers in elementary-, machine operator-and clerical occupations were more likely to be wageemployed (84-93 percent on average in the pooled sample, versus only 57 percent for workers outside of manufacturing), whereas the`formality gap' between manufacturing craftsmen and other industries is smaller and insignicant. Dierences across manufacturing occupations are particularly striking for low and middle income countries: even compared to the manufacturing average, workers in elementary-, machine operatorand clerical occupations in these countries were between 13-42 percentage points more likely to be wage employed. Also the other formality indicators point in the same direction as craftsmen consistently score the lowest, pulling down the manufacturing average.
Appendix Table C .4 presents the results of regressions of the share of wage employment on country xed eects and a trend: it suggests that the share of wage employment increased slightly over time for machine operators and professionals (by 1.6 and 1.0 percentage points per decade, respectively), but did not change signicantly for the other occupations. Hence, the cross-sectional ranking of occupations in terms of formality is likely to be representative for the sample period.
In summary, this suggests that premature deindustrialization is slowing down the formalization of labor markets: industrialization has traditionally created formal employment opportunities already at intermediate income levels mostly by creating elementary-, machine operator-and (to a lesser extent) clerical jobs.
However, these are precisely the occupations accounting for the`premature' employment losses. The task descriptions in the denition of the ISCO major groups by the ILO, presented in Appendix B,
give a rst indication of task dierences between occupations. A second widely used measure is the Routine Task Intensity (RTI) index introduced by Autor and Dorn (2013) : it summarizes the relative importance of routine-to non-routine tasks in an occupation, and has been used as a proxy for its vulnerability to automation by ICT. 17
Figure 5 presents average RTI scores by occupation, standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one for the overall labor market. All manufacturing occupations except for professionals score higher than zero, indicating an above-average vulnerability to automation by ICT. Clerks score particularly highwhich is consistent with the ILO's assessment that their`main tasks require the knowledge and experience necessary to organise, store, compute and retrieve information' (quoted from the description of major groups in Appendix B), and the notion that ICT has sharply reduced the need for workers to engage in such tasks.
Quantitatively more important are machine operators: their main tasks consist of`operating and monitoring (...) production machinery and equipment'. While factory production with mechanically operated machines requires a large number of operators, it appears plausible that a move to more autonomous, digitally controlled machines reduces the need for unskilled human machine operators. 18 Finally, elementary occupations require`mostly simple and routine tasks'-and while the relation to ICT is somewhat less clear than for clerks and machine operators, it is well established that a move to more advanced continuous-process methods reduces the demand for unskilled laborers. 19 At the other end of the routine task intensity spectrum, professionals engage in`planning, directing and coordinating' and`applying scientic and artistic concepts and theories to the solution of problems', which are tasks that are arguably more complementary to than substitutable for ICT. Next to professionals, also craftsmen have been spared from premature deindustrialization, although they score high on routine 17 The task measures underlying the RTI index come from Autor et al. (2003) , and are based on the 1977 edition of the US Dictionary of Occupational Titles'. I use the translation of these task scores into sub-major groups of ISCO by Goos et al. (2014) . See Appendix Figure C .3 for the individual task scores by occupation, and an explanation for how they are aggregated into the RTI index.
18 Appendix Figure shows that machine operators have the second highest score on`set limits, tolerances and standards'. Autor et al. (2003) use this task score as a measure for an occupation's demand for routine cognitive tasks, which appear particularly suitable to being taken over by digitally controlled machines. 19 Continuous process methods take in raw matrials and produce nished goods, with few hands intervening in production. Goldin and Katz (1998) argue that the adoption of such methods reduces the need for elementary occupations by automating hauling and conveying operations. task intensity. One explanation is that manufacturing craftsmen have been vulnerable to automation even before the advent of ICTas argued already by Jerome (1934) for the US, and documented for a wide range of countries since the 1950s by Kunst (2019) . 20 Hence, while craftsmen jobs continue to disappear with increasing automation already at low levels of income (as is apparent in Figure 3) , there has not been a sharp reduction in the demand for craftsmen, conditional on income, after 1990. 21 In summary, the evidence suggests that premature industrialization is characterized by job losses in occupations that appear particularly vulnerable to ICT. This is consistent with evidence of increasing technology adoption in developing countries in recent decades: capital intensities in manufacturing have increased signicantly in countries of all income levels (Kunst, 2019) , and Jaumotte et al. (2013) show that also in developing countries, the share of ICT capital in the capital stock has increased rapidly after 1990. Also the World Bank's 2008 report on technology diusion in developing countries concludes that the speed at which developing countries adopt new technologies has increased since 1990. 22 20 According to ISCO, craftsmen are`occupations whose tasks require the knowledge and experience of skilled trades or handicrafts'. For the US, Jerome (1934) predicts that`the principal eect of further mechanization of the processing operations will be to decrease the demand for semiskilled workers. (...) On the whole, the shift will continue to be from the emphasis on the trade skill typical of the handicraftsman to, on the one hand, the alertness and intelligence required in handling fast and intricate machinery and, on the other, to the more formal training required in the engineering and production planning departments' (pp. 402-403) . 21 Because craftsmen score higher in terms of the RTI index than machine operators and elementary occupations, the association between the RTI index of an occupation group and its propensity to experience premature deindustrialization after 1990 is imperfect. Appendix Table C .5 tests whether it is still true that on average, occupation groups with a higher RTI score experienced signicantly stronger premature deindustrialization: the sample corresponds to the one from Table 2, with the dierence that it stacks the employment shares in the dierent occupations. To exploit the full available variation in RTI scores, it distinguishes between major groups 1-3 (`managers',`professionals' and`associate professionals'), which all have RTI scores below 0 and are subsumed into the`professional' category in the rest of this paper. The specication includes countryoccupation xed eecs, in analogy to the country xed eects of the specications in Table 2 . The signicant`triple interactions' between the ln GDP per capita terms, the RTI index and the post-1990 dummy show that occupations with a high RTI index did on average experience stronger premature deindustrialization. Therefore, the argument that premature deindustrialization after 1990 has been driven in particular by occupations that are vulnerable to ICT adoption is also robust to considering the RTI index as a perfect proxy for this vulnerability. The routine task intensity (RTI) scores are calculated as in Autor and Dorn (2013) , based on the translation of task scores from the 1977 US`Dictionary of Occupational Titles' into sub-major groups of ISCO-88 by Goos et al. (2014) . It is normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one across these sub-major groups. The gure shows occupation group averages constructed from 11 sub-major groups that are relevant to manufacturing, as indicated by representation among the manufacturing occupations in the extended`Occupational Wages Around the World' database (and hence, in the underlying ILO`October Inquiry'-see for more details). This excludes major groups 5 (`Service and sales workers') and 6 (`Skilled agricultural, forestry and shery workers'), as well as some sub-major groups that do not play a role in manufacturing (for instance, sub-major group 23:`Teaching Professionals').
Stylized Fact IV: Some Manufacturing Jobs also Appear at lower Levels of Income The simulations summarized in Figure 3 suggest that while manufacturing employment overall peaked at lower income and employment levels after 1990, low income countries actually saw more rather than less manufacturing employment. 23 One concern is that this nding may be driven by the implicitly assumed 23 The curves intersect around $9,000 for total manufacturing, $11,100 for elementary occupations, $9,100 for machine operators and $8,700 for clerkssuggesting higher manufacturing employment below that income level after 1990. In 2014 (the last year in the sample), about 42 percent of the world population lived in countries with a GDP per capita below $9,000 in 2011 20 symmetry when using a quadratic functional form. However, Figure 6 shows that at least for the joint employment share in machine operator and elementary occupations, also locally weighted regressions on the raw data suggest that low income countries have been spared from premature job losses, and possibly even had higher manufacturing employment after 1990 (conditional on income). 24 The Goldin and Katz (1998) framework on the eects of technological change in manufacturing on labor demand oers an explanation: in their model, the`rst transition' from production in artisanal shops to factories increases the demand for unskilled workers in machine operator and elementary occupations, before further advances of the production technology reduce it.
While the original framework has been used to explain the US experience, it also appears relevant to recent labor demand trends in developing countries: Section 2 shows that manufacturing in low income countries still used to be dominated by craftsmen and hence relatively small-scale and artisanal. This is consistent with the characterization of manufacturing in developing countries in the literature review by Tybout (2000) . Moroever, the evidence suggests that there has been an acceleration of technology adoption (as argued in the previous Section), which would be expected to change the composition of occupational labor demand towards occupations associated with larger-scale factory production. 25 international dollars-with China above, yet India below this income threshold. When translating the nominal World Bank income group-thresholds in 1990 to 2011 international dollars using the average Penn World Table price level estimates from the respective income group, the`low income' country-threshold stood at about $2,100, and the`lower middle' income country threshold stood at about $9,900. Hence, the simulations suggest that countries classied as low income countries in 1990, as well as many lower middle income countries, have been spared from premature deindustrialization. Table C .3 shows that also the decrease of the manufacturing wage premium among unskilled workers has been driven by middle income countries, whereas the point estimate is smaller and insignicant (though still negative) for low income countries. In summary, the evidence suggests that premature deindustrialization has to date spared low income countries. There are even some signs of increasing manufacturing employment conditional on income for poorer developing countries, most clearly in elementary and machine operator occupations. This is consistent with the view that the move from artisanal to more modern, larger-scale production creates opportunities for employment industrialization in low income countriesin particular if they follow the example of countries like Cambodia or China by tapping into foreign demand for consumer goods in relatively low-tech manufacturing industries such as garments, footwear or electronics assembly.
Concluding Remarks
Occupational employment trends paint a nuanced picture of the future prospects for manufacturing-led growth in developing countries: on the one hand, the trend towards more open goods and capital markets appears to facilitate some employment industrialization in low income countries by increasing technology transfer and export opportunities. 28 At the same time, this technology transfer appears to have markedly reduced employment opportunities in unskilled, yet formal, machine operator and elementary occupations even in middle income countries in recent decades, resulting in much lower peak manufacturing employment shares in these occupations.
It is useful to compare this account with Akamatsu's (1962) `ying geese paradigm' of development: in his metaphor, the technologically most advanced countries are`chased' by exporters of consumer goods, which are in turn chased by exporters of raw materials, the least advanced countries. The occupational employment pattern can then be understood as resulting from a reduction in the technological distance between countries (or as`geese ying closer together'): low income countries move towards the export of consumer goods such as garments, creating employment in the more formal manufacturing occupations, whereas middle income countries adopt the capital-and skill-intensive production technologies of the most advanced countries, resulting in employment losses in the occupations that are most vulnerable to ICT adoption. 29 The notion of a convergence of manufacturing production technologies is consistent with China, a middle income country, being the largest buyer of high-tech industrial robots in 2017, accounting for more than a third of global robot sales (International Federation of Robotics, 2018) . It is also consistent with the ndings of a companion paper (Kunst, 2019) , which documents that capital intensities in manufacturing have increased substantially over recent decades also in developing countrieswith profound impacts on the structure of occupational employment and wages within manufacturing. Finally, it is in line with both 28 See Jaumotte et al. (2013) for an illustration of the increases in various measures of trade and nancial openness by income group since 1980. 29 In the notation of Akamatsu (1962) , low income countries are moving from stages one and two (import of consumer goods and production for the domestic market) to stage three (export of consumer goods), whereas middle income countries join high income countries by moving from stage three to stage four (product dierentiation and export of capital goods). Akamatsu also acknowledges that the distance between the`ying geese' can vary over time:`however, these countries, advanced and less advanced, do not necessarily go forward at the same speed in their development of a wild-geese-ying pattern, nor do they always make gradual progress, but they are at times dormant and at other times make leaping advances' (p. 18). stylized facts emerging from the historical account of technology adoption by Comin and Hobijn (2010): while there are large cross-country dierences in the extent to which new technologies are adopted, the adoption lag length has decreased over time.
From this perspective, premature deindustrialization is the result of a global shift of the frontier separating manufacturing tasks that are automated from those that are still performed by human labor. Therefore, it appears unlikely that China further moving up the development ladder will bring back unskilled manufacturing employment on a large scale to other developing countries, as suggested by Haraguchi et al. (2017) .
Rather, the question is whether further shifts of the`automation frontier' will reduce the scope for even the moderate increases in unskilled manufacturing employment that still prevails today in low income countries.
Note that this account does not negate the role of globalization in creating premature deindustrialization: increasing openness has facilitated technology transferand also increased the pressure to adopt more advanced production technologies via stronger import competition, as well as increased the benets of doing so by facilitating the access to the markets of high income countries (featuring higher quality standards). Moreover, Rodrik (2018) argues that the emergence of global value chains with consecutive and interdependent production steps has reduced the scope of manufacturing rms in developing countries to substitute capital with unskilled labor, which is consistent with the decrease in the`manufacturing premium' of unskilled workers documented in this paper. 30 250 years after the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, it appears that manufacturing is losing its ability to employ unskilled workers more productively than other industries. As Rodrik (2018) points out, this implies that developing countries, abundant in unskilled labor, lose their comparative advantage in producing an increasing range of manufactured goods. 31 Hence, future growth in developing countries may have to rely more on improvements in`fundamentals' such as education and governance, and policy makers need to focus on a broader range of sectoral policies than in the past (Stiglitz, 2018) . Absent a reduction in the`formality gap' between manufacturing and other industries, it will also create employment that is less formal. 30 Global value chains may also have aected manufacturing occupations asymmetrically, as they entail the relocation of specic production tasksas opposed to entire production processesacross countries. However, Reijnders and de Vries (2018) decompose the changes in routine versus non-routine jobs in thirty-seven advanced and emerging countries over the period 19992007 into those that are due to technological change and those that are due to task relocation, and nd that the contribution of technological change has been an order of magnitude larger (cf. their Figure F. 2). This suggests that technological change within countries has been the main proximate driver of the asymmetric deindustrialization trends across manufacturing occupations documented in this paper.
31 This is also evidenced by the increasing attention to the phenomenon of`reshoring' of production to high income countries (Gray et al., 2013) . The additional 23 countries, which enter into the calculations in Table 3 understanding of materials and tools to be used, as well as of all stages of the production process, including the characteristics and the intended use of the nal product. The main tasks consist of extracting raw materials, constructing buildings and other structures and making various products as well as handicraft goods. Most occupations in this major group require skills at the second ISCO skill level. This major group has been divided into four sub-major groups, 16 minor groups and 70 unit groups, reecting dierences in tasks associated with dierent areas of specialisation.
8. Plant and machine operators and assemblers: This major group includes occupations whose main tasks require the knowledge and experience necessary to operate and monitor large scale, and often highly automated, industrial machinery and equipment. The main tasks consist of operating and monitoring mining, processing and production machinery and equipment, as well as driving vehicles and driving and operating mobile plant, or assembling products from component parts. Most occupations in this major group require skills at the second ISCO skill level. This major group has been divided into three sub-major groups, 20 minor groups and 70 unit groups, reecting dierences in tasks associated with dierent areas of specialisation.
9. Elementary occupations: This major group covers occupations which require the knowledge and experience necessary to perform mostly simple and routine tasks, involving the use of hand-held tools and in some cases considerable physical eort, and, with few exceptions, only limited personal initiative or judgement. The main tasks consist of selling goods in streets, doorkeeping and property watching, as well as cleaning, washing, pressing, and working as labourers in the elds of mining, agriculture and shing, construction and manufacturing. Most occupations in this major group require skills at the rst ISCO skill level. This major group has been divided into three sub-major groups, ten minor groups and 25 unit groups, reecting dierences in tasks associated with dierent areas of work. Coecients are obtained from a regression of 8,258 average annual log wages from 24 manufacturing occupations that belonging to one of the 4 occupation groups on country-year dummies and major group dummies. The sample does not include wages from clerical occupations. See Kunst (2019) for an analyses of trends in occupational wage premia in manufacturing over time. The manufacturing premium is calculated as 100*the log ratio of income of those with at most incomplete primary schooling who are employed in manufacturing relative to those who work in a dierent industry. Wage data are taken from IPUMS and I2D2. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01. The manufacturing premium is calculated as 100*the log ratio of income of those with at most incomplete primary schooling who are employed in manufacturing relative to those who work in a dierent industry. Wage data are taken from IPUMS and I2D2. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01. description. I make use of a translation of these US scores into sub-major groups of ISCO-88 by Goos et al. (2014) .
The gure shows occupation group averages constructed from 11 sub-major groups that are relevant to manufacturing, as indicated by representation among the manufacturing occupations in the extended`Occupational Wages Around the World' database (and hence, in the ILO`October Inquiry', which it is based on-see for a description). This excludes major groups 5 (`Service and sales workers') and 6 (`Skilled agricultural, forestry and shery workers'), as well as some sub-major groups that appear not relevant for manufacturing (for instance, sub-major group 23:`Teaching Professionals').
The RTI indices of occupations in Figure 5 are calculated from the individual task indices as follows, following Autor et al. (2003) : rst, they are combined to produce three task aggregates: the Manual task measure corresponds to the DOT variable measuring an occupation's demand for eye-hand-foot coordination; the Routine task measure is a simple average of two DOT variables, set limits, tolerances and standards measuring an occupation's demand for routine cognitive tasks, and nger dexterity, measuring an occupation's use of routine motor tasks; and the Abstract task measure is the average of two DOT variables: direction control and planning, measuring managerial and interactive tasks, and GED Math, measuring mathematical and formal reasoning requirements. Second, the RTI index is constructed from these aggregates as the dierence between the log of Routine task score and the sum of the log of Abstract and the log of Manual tasks scores. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01. The sample corresponds to the one from Table 2 , with the dierence that it stacks the employment shares in seven occupation groups:`managers',`professionals',`associate professionals',`clerks',`craftsman',`machine operators' and`elementary occupations'. The number of observations hence results from multiplying the 925 country-years with the 7 occupations.
RTI' stands for the index of Routine Task Intensity.`Population controls' in the bottom panel stands for ln population and its square, as well as interactions with the RTI score. The row`F-test joint GDP/c' presents the p-values of an F-test for joint signicance of ln GDP/c and its square, interacted with the RTI score and a`post-1990' dummy.
